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ABSTRACT 
 
There are substantial differences in output per job across states that have persisted over time.  This study 
demonstrates that in the context of a neoclassical growth model, differences in marginal tax rates on 
income from capital investment, capital ownership, and consumption will lead to persistent differences in 
labor productivity across states.  Conversely, taxes on wages will not alter labor productivity.  These 
theoretical predictions are supported by data on state marginal tax rates and output per job over the 1981-
2015 sample period.  Over that period, the mix of state marginal tax rates lower labor productivity by an 
average of 15% per year and lower per capita income and wages per job by just under 10% per year.  The 
implied loss of labor productivity differs substantially between states from -3% in Wyoming to -22% in 
California. Because states infrequently change their tax structures, the productivity differences across 
states associated with distortionary tax policies persist over time.  
 
Key Words:  Labor productivity, sales tax, property tax, income tax, corporate tax, capital gains 
tax, unemployment insurance, growth, efficiency 
 
JEL Classification: H2, H3, H7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Corresponding Author:  Peter F. Orazem, Department of Economics, Iowa State University, Ames, IA  
50011-1070.  pfo@iastate.edu 
1 
 
I. Introduction 
 There are large differences in labor productivity across states.  Output per job in 
Delaware averages over $100 thousand per job, 79% larger than output per job in Montana.  
Despite presumed free flow of labor and capital across states, large productivity gaps have 
persisted over the past 25 years.  The correlation between state output per job in 1981 and 2015 
is 0.98.  Because output per job and wages are theoretically and empirically tied, the persistent 
variation in labor productivity implies persistent wage inequality across states.  Hence, 
identifying the impediments to conversion in labor productivity is necessary if we are to reduce 
income inequality across states.1 
Capital investments and technological innovation have played a major role in the growth 
of labor productivity in the U.S. economy since 1980 (Jorgenson, Ho and Stiroh, 2005).  
Differences in capital investment or technology across firms have been tied to differences in 
earnings and productivity between otherwise identical workers in the United States (Autor et al, 
2008; Dunne et al, 2004; Goldin and Katz, 2008;  Acemoglu and Autor, 2011; Syverson, 2011).  
As a result, differences in capital accumulation would plausibly have a role in the persistent 
differences in labor productivity across states.   
This study investigates whether persistent differences in distortionary tax policies across 
states may have caused persistent differences in capital investment across states.  We provide 
evidence consistent with that hypothesis, showing that other things equal, state marginal tax rates 
combine to lower labor productivity by an average of 15% per year.  Because states do not alter 
their tax structures frequently, state tax structures cause persistent differences in productivity 
across states.  The correlation in estimated decline in labor productivity associated with state tax 
                                                                 
1 See Faggio (2010) and Card et al (2018) for two examples of how wage inequality is related to unequal labor 
productivity between firms. 
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structure between 1981 and 2015 is 0.78.  High marginal state tax rates on corporate income, 
property, and sales prove the most damaging to labor productivity.  Taxes on wage income are 
the least damaging both in theory and in our empirical tests.    Meanwhile, labor productivity is 
only positively influenced by a state’s per capita government expenditures on capital 
investments. 
II.  Literature Review 
 Our study builds on an extensive literature that explores the large differences in labor 
productivity across countries.2  Some of the variation in productivity is due to poorer resources 
that restrict capital investments per worker, but as Hsieh and Klenow (2009) show, as much as 
30-50% of the productivity gap between China, India and the U.S. is due to inefficient 
allocations of available resources.  Studies disagree about the proximate cause of the resource 
misallocations. Chari et al (1997), McGrattan and Prescott (2005) and Mankiw et al (2009) argue 
that capital investment is discouraged by distortions in the return to capital driven by taxes.  
However, Levine and Renelt (1992) found that capital investment in a large sample of countries 
was unresponsive to fiscal policies.  Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) and 
Alesina and Giuliano (2015) trace low levels of capital investment to the lack of trust in 
government institutions as indicated by expropriation, corruption, uneven administration of the 
rule of law, or restraint of trade.  Sachs (2005) blames the lack of capital investment on an 
inability to save because output in poor countries does not exceed subsistence consumption 
needs.  Hsieh and Klenow (2007) blame distortions caused by very low prices of consumer 
goods relative to investment goods.   
                                                                 
2 See Levine and Renelt (1992), Mankiw, Romer, and Weill (1992) and reviews by McGrattan and Schmitz (1999) 
and Chari and Kehoe (2006). 
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 Our focus on a single country has some distinct advantages over the cross-country data 
sets with respect to isolating the effect of tax distortions on capital accumulation.  Our results 
will not be clouded by differences in currency values, liquidity constraints, federal government 
regulatory, legal or political institutions, or even cultural differences that have complicated 
identification of tax effects in cross-country studies.3  The availability of multiple state 
observations per year also allows us to control for common macroeconomic shocks that could 
otherwise complicate identification of tax effects.  
 Past research of the effects of state tax policy on economic outcomes have yielded mixed 
results. Some empirical analyses have found that state taxes have large negative effects on new 
business location (Papke ,1993), on investment incentives for domestic firms relative to foreign 
firms who can claim tax credits (Hines, 1996), on income (Giertz, 2010;  Adhikari and Alm, 
2016.) or income growth (Reed, 2008).  Nevertheless, replications or reviews by Waslyenko  
(1997),  Alm and Rogers (2011) and Gale et al (2015) suggest that the magnitude, significance, 
and even the direction of the estimated tax effects appears to be sensitive to changes in sample or 
specification.  Other studies emphasize that the effect of government size on growth depends on 
the size of the government sector relative to the private sector (Brown, Hayes and Taylor, 2003) 
or the growth of government expenditures (Taylor and Brown, 2006). 
 These uneven results are surprising given the theoretical consensus that high marginal tax 
rates are particularly damaging to capital investment.4  Our findings are much more consistent 
with the theoretical consensus.  We believe this is because our analysis more closely mimics the 
theoretical relationship between tax rates and output per job: 1) We use marginal rather than 
                                                                 
3 For example, Prescott (2002) argued that differences in hours worked between Europe and the United States are 
attributable to tax differences, but Alesina et al (2005) argued that differences across countries in union power, tastes 
for leisure, employment protection, or other government policies are equally consistent with the data. 
4 See the review by Mankiw, Weinzierl and Yagan (2009). 
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average tax rates; 2) We incorporate a full menu of 6 tax types rather than a subset of tax 
instruments as required by theory; 3) We do not incorporate endogenous employment or capital 
as regressors; and 4) We conduct the analysis in levels, consistent both with theory and with 
prior work that suggests differenced data is inappropriate when analyzing slowly changing 
phenomena .  As our empirical work demonstrates, across numerous alternative specifications, 
higher state marginal tax rates on sales, corporate income and property lower labor productivity, 
consistent with the presumed greater distortionary effects of high marginal tax rates on input 
prices, output prices and returns to capital.  However, taxes and wages have neutral effects on 
productivity. 
 We first demonstrate that labor productivity differs across states and those differences 
persist over time.  We then present a representative agent model that demonstrates that the 
equilibrium level of labor productivity will depend on the mix of marginal tax rates in the state.  
After reviewing the data and empirical strategy, we present results that show evidence in support 
of the predicted negative relationship between distortionary marginal tax rates and labor 
productivity.  Results suggest that distortionary marginal tax rates lower labor productivity by an 
average of 15% across the states.  There are large differences in the extent to which states rely on 
distortionary tax structures.  In 2015, the decrease in labor productivity attributed to state 
marginal tax rate structure ranged from -3% in Wyoming to -22% in California.  with an average 
reduction in labor productivity estimated effects of a 10% increase in marginal rates varying 
from -1.6% in Nevada to -3.9% in New York.  Next, we show that there is only weak evidence 
supporting the view that tax rates are endogenous responses to past productivity shocks or altered 
in anticipation of productivity outcomes.  We conclude with an assessment of the relative 
efficiency of tax types as revenue generators compared to their distortionary effects on 
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productivity.  Of the 6 tax types we investigate, income and sales taxes generate the most 
revenue per 1% lost productivity, while corporate and capital gains taxes generate relatively little 
revenue from the same productivity loss. 
III. Variation in the Level and Source of State Labor Productivity 
 Labor productivity differs substantially across states.  Those differences persist over time.  
The correlation in state output per job in 1981 and in 2015 is 0.98.   On the other hand, the 
correlation between state output per job in 1981 and the growth in output per job between 1981 
and 2015 is 0.09.  The small positive correlation indicates that state output per job is not 
converging, a finding pointed out previously by Bauer et al (2012).5  The three states with the 
lowest output per job among the 48 contiguous states in 1981 (Maine, South Carolina and 
Vermont) were ranked 45, 43 and 44 in 2015. 
One should focus on levels rather than growth rates of output per job because, over time, 
levels of labor productivity are persistent and growth in labor productivity is almost random.  As 
discussed by Hall and Jones (1999, p.85), government policies change levels but not growth 
rates.  In fact, both theory and evidence suggest that jurisdictions will tend to grow at similar 
rates.  Moreover, Hall and Jones (1999) and Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) found that Solow 
growth models are more consistent than endogenous growth models in explaining the long-run 
economic performance of nations.  The stylized facts regarding the growth of states suggest a 
similar modeling strategy should hold for states as well. 
The stylized facts regarding state growth are usefully described by decomposing labor 
productivity into two parts.  In every year t since 1981 and for every state i, we have data on 
                                                                 
5 Turner et al (2013) argued that productivity was converging across states between 1840 and 2000, but most of the 
convergence was before 1940.  Their figure 9 suggests that since 1960, labor productivity has remained constant or 
increased depending on the measure, consistent with rising income inequality in the United States.  
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Gross State Product (Qit), and number of jobs by state (Lit).  We can represent Qit as the product 
of the number of jobs and the average product per job, 
𝑄𝑖𝑡
𝐿𝑖𝑡
. 6  
(1)     𝑄𝑖𝑡 =  𝐿𝑖𝑡 · (
𝑄𝑖𝑡
𝐿𝑖𝑡
) 
 Taking logs and totally differentiating (1), we can characterize changes in Gross State 
Product (GSP) over time from some base year 0 to year t as 
(2)     𝑑𝑙𝑛(𝑄𝑖𝑡) = 𝑑𝑙𝑛(𝐿𝑖𝑡) + 𝑑𝑙𝑛 (
𝑄𝑖𝑡
𝐿𝑖𝑡
) 
State i’s growth in aggregate output is decomposed into two parts, the first attributable to growth 
in labor productivity and the second due to growth in employment.   
 We illustrate the results in Figure 1.  Between 1981 and 2015, real state GSP in the 48 
contiguous states grew an average of 86% or about 1.8% per year.  Growth in labor productivity 
is responsible for 58% of GSP growth, while increases in employment explain the remaining 
42%.   As the trend lines in Figure 1 show, the fastest growing states depend predominantly on 
labor productivity growth.  However, states vary considerably in productivity growth, from a low 
of 17.5% in West Virginia to a high of 120% in Nevada.  The 3 states with the fastest 
productivity growth (Nevada, Florida and Utah) are among the top 4 in GSP growth.   
Wage growth will be driven by productivity growth.  Wage gaps across states would 
diminish if the fastest productivity growth occurred in states with the lowest initial productivity 
levels.  Instead, gaps in wages and productivity have persisted since the 1970s.  All of these 
states face the same macroeconomic policies, interstate regulatory structures, legal institutions, 
and cyclical and technological shocks.  They face similar prices of consumption and investment 
                                                                 
6 Our productivity measure is gross state product per job rather than per worker or per hour.  We use this because of 
the long-run consistency in measurement.  Bauer and Lee (2006) showed that per worker and per hour measures of 
labor productivity have similar long-run trends.  Bureau of Labor Statistics data shows that the incidence of 
moonlighting has only changed modestly over time.  The average in the 1980s was 5.6% and the average between 
2004-13 was 5.4%.  Hence, the per job, per worker and per hour measures should yield similar results.  We test the 
sensitivity of our results to other measures in the results section. 
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goods.  Consequently, such large and persistent differences in levels of labor productivity across 
states beg for an explanation, especially because there is an incentive for workers to shift from 
low productivity to high productivity states which should lead labor productivity to equalize 
across states over time.   
 There is a strong prima facie case that state labor productivity is driven by capital per 
worker in the state.  Around 1980, the U.S. began to experience an extended period of rising 
returns to schooling that has been attributed to rising firm investments in information 
technologies and other forms of capital.  Capital and skill are complements, and so rising 
investments in capital have been shown to increase the employment and earnings of the more 
educated workers in the United States.7  Income inequality across regions has also been tied to 
persistent differences in key factors of production, most notably physical and human capital 
(Bauer et al, 2012; Turner et al ,2013; Stephens et al, 2013; Islam et al, 2015).  Given the 
presumption of easy flow of labor or capital across borders, the source of these persistent 
differences in factors across political jurisdictions is unclear.  Should variation in state and local 
tax policies alter the incentives to invest in capital, to reside, or to work in one state versus 
another, then tax policies will affect labor productivity across states.8 If tax policies are not 
changed over time, then the inefficient allocation of capital across states will result in persistent 
differences in labor productivity.  We illustrate the argument in the next section. 
IV. Theory  
Past studies attempting to demonstrate tax effects on capital investment by state have 
been hampered by the lack of data on firm capital stocks by state. Instead, studies have relied on 
                                                                 
7 See Goldin and Katz (2008) and Autor, Katz and Kearney (2008). 
8  Employment levels may also respond to state fiscal policies, but employment shifts are also influenced by factors 
that have caused the U.S. population to shift West and South such as rising demand for living near n atural amenities 
or immigration location patterns . 
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national data on capital stock by industry prorated to the state level using the state’s share of the 
industry.  Paradoxically, the prorated capital data impose that all states have the same capital 
intensity by industry, an assumption that presumes capital investment does not respond to state 
tax structures.9 Measuring capital stocks over time is also complicated by depreciation rates and 
differences in book versus market value. We use an alternate strategy that avoids the problem of 
absent or mismeasured data on capital.  Couching our analysis in the context of a neoclassical 
growth model with a menu of taxes, we show that the equilibrium level of labor productivity is 
determined by the marginal tax rates on sales, capital gains, corporate income, and property.  
Therefore, we can assess the implied effects of distortionary taxes on investments indirectly 
through their effects on output per job without requiring an explicit measure of capital.   
We derive a relationship between labor productivity and four alternative taxes commonly 
imposed by state and local governments: 
𝜏𝑘 :  The tax rate on capital income; 
𝜏𝑤 : The tax rate on wage income; 
𝜏𝑝:  The property tax rate;  
τs :   The sales tax rate. 
 
 We do so in the context of a neoclassical growth model involving an infinitely lived 
representative household, an infinitely lived representative firm, and a government authority that 
imposes taxes and distributes revenues.  Our choice of the neoclassical growth model was driven 
by the finding that there is more systematic variation across states in the levels rather than the 
growth rates of output per job. 
                                                                 
9 Examples include Munnell (1990), Holtz-Eakin (1994), Crain and Lee (1999); Brown, Hayes and Taylor (2003); 
Reed (2008); and Yamarick (2013).  The only study which we found that had an actual state level measure of capital 
was Turner et al (2013), but they did not examine the causes of different allocations of capital across states.  In a 
paper most similar to ours in the consideration of multiple tax rates as they affect the impact of corporate income 
taxes, Giroud and Rauh (2015) use firm-level measures of capital and the location of plants  as their capital 
indicators. 
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 Households choose how much to consume, how much to work, and how much to save 
(invest), subject to exogenously imposed taxes on capital income, wage income and property.  
The firm decides how much labor and capital to use in production subject to exogenously 
imposed sales taxes.  The government does not engage in an optimal tax policy, an assumption 
that is not too strong in our context because the taxes are a mixture of apparently uncoordinated 
state and locally set taxes that vary too much across states to reflect any common behavioral rule.  
The government is only allowed a limited role in the economy, balancing the budget every 
period by collecting taxes and redistributing all revenues back to the household.  We assume that 
capital is perfectly mobile across states but that labor is fixed at least in the short-run.10 
The representative household 
The household’s preferences are given by  
(3) ∑ 𝐵𝑡[𝛼𝑙𝑛𝑐𝑡
∞
𝑡=0 +  (1 − 𝛼)𝑙𝑛 (1 − 𝑙𝑡)] 
where ct denotes real consumption of a single homogeneous good and lt denotes household’s 
labor supply. The parameters B and α are, respectively, household tastes for time preference and 
relative taste for consumption versus leisure.  Total time is normalized to one, and so (1- lt) is the 
time devoted to leisure.  The household gets income from three sources, labor it rents to firms at 
the market wage rate 𝑤𝑡; real holdings of capital, 𝑘𝑡 that it rents to firms at the pretax market 
rental rate, 𝑟𝑡 ; and a lump-sum transfer it receives from the government, G.  With 𝜏𝑘  as the tax 
rate on capital income; 𝜏𝑤  as the tax on wage income; and 𝜏𝑝  as the property tax rate (the tax on 
capital holdings); the household’s budget constraint is  
(4) 𝑐𝑡 + 𝑘𝑡+1 ≤ (1 − 𝜏𝑤 )𝑤𝑡𝑙𝑡 + (1 − 𝜏𝑘)𝑟𝑡 𝑘𝑡 + (1 − 𝛿 − 𝜏𝑝)𝑘𝑡 + 𝐺𝑡  
                                                                 
10 This is consistent with Slemrod and Bakija’s (2008, p. 81) observation that even though capital is not perfectly 
mobile, it is more mobile than labor and so the impact of capital taxes are shifted onto workers.  It also is consistent 
with our finding in the previous section that labor supply shifts are not sufficient to eliminate or even diminish gaps 
in productivity over time. 
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where 𝛿 represents the capital depreciation rate.   
The first-order conditions imply that households equate the marginal rate of substitution between 
consumption and leisure to their relative prices:  
(5A)  
(1−𝛼)𝑐𝑡
𝛼 (1−𝑙𝑡)
= (1 − 𝜏𝑊)𝑤𝑡; 
and the Euler condition that fixes growth of capital to the pre-tax rate of interest 
5B) 𝑟𝑡 =
𝐵−1−1+𝛿+𝜏𝑝
1−𝜏𝑘
 
Note that if the tax rates don’t change, and with fixed depreciation and discount rates, the pretax 
return on capital is fixed over time.   
The representative firm 
The representative firm hires labor and capital stock in order to produce output according to the 
CES production function,   
(6) 𝑦𝑡 = 𝐴 [𝜃𝑘𝑡
1−
1
𝜀 + (1 − 𝜃)𝑙
𝑡
1−
1
𝜀 ]
𝜀
𝜀−1
 
where 𝜀 is the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor. The firm’s profit maximization 
problem is to select 𝑘𝑡 and 𝑙𝑡 to maximize profit 
(7) Πt = {(1 − τs)𝐴 [𝜃𝑘𝑡
1−
1
𝜀 + (1 − 𝜃)𝑙
𝑡
1−
1
𝜀 ]
𝜀
𝜀−1
− 𝑤𝑡𝑙𝑡 − 𝑟𝑡 𝑘𝑡} 
which yields the optimal capital labor ratio  
(8) 
𝑘𝑡
𝑙𝑡
= (
𝜃
(1−𝜃)
𝑤𝑡
𝑟𝑡
)
𝜀
 
The government  
The government collects all four taxes and rebates all revenues back to the household in the form 
of a lump sum rebate,  
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(9) 𝐺𝑡 =  𝜏𝑤𝑤𝑡 𝑙𝑡 + 𝜏𝑠 𝑦𝑡 + 𝜏𝑝𝑘𝑡 + 𝜏𝑘𝑟𝑡 𝑘𝑡 
The lump-sum transfer could be viewed as a nonrival public good that has no distortionary effect 
on the prices of consumption or investment goods.  If we wanted to allow governmental 
distortions, we could add Gt directly into the production function (8), as was commonly done in 
the literature on productive public infrastructure expenditures.11  However, we can allow 
nonneutral effects of government spending if they enter the Hicksian aggregate term, A in (8) as 
a source of productive externalities on private production.  
Equilibrium  
The equilibrium condition for the wage level is  
(10)   𝑤𝑡 = [
(1−𝜃)𝜀
([(1−𝜏𝑠)𝐴]
1−𝜀 −
𝜃𝜀
𝑟𝑡
𝜀−1)
]
1
𝜀−1
 
Because wages are equal to the value of the marginal product of labor, equation (13) is also a 
representation of equilibrium labor productivity.  The equilibrium wage reflects the equilibrium 
choice of capital, and so we can assess the effect of tax rates on capital investment indirectly 
through their effect on wages and labor productivity. 
 Equation (10) implies that the wage and the marginal product of labor will fall as the 
sales tax rate rises.  That reduces the capital per unit labor through (8).    From (5B), we know 
that the before-tax interest rate rises with the property tax rate and the capital income tax rate 
which lowers equilibrium capital per unit labor through (8).  In addition, the property tax and 
capital income tax rates lower equilibrium wages and labor productivity, as can be confirmed by 
taking the derivative of 𝑤𝑡 with respect to 𝑟𝑡  in (10).  The theory demonstrates that the effect of 
taxes on capital can be inferred by the effect of taxes on labor productivity. 
                                                                 
11 See for examples Aschauer (1989), Lynde and Richmond (1993), or Pereira (2000). 
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 Importantly, equation (10) states that the effect of marginal tax rates on productivity will 
be found in the levels of productivity and not necessarily in the changes in productivity.  States 
with higher marginal tax rates on capital income, property values and sales will have 
permanently lower labor productivity and capital per worker than their neighbors with lower 
marginal tax rates.  However, high marginal tax rates may not alter the rate of growth, and so 
trying to determine the effect of tax rates using growth measures may difference away the 
information.  This was first pointed out by Easterly et al (1993) who showed that when there is 
little correlation of growth rates over time as we find in section III, differences in growth rates 
will be transitory and will not reflect underlying structural differences across states.  In other 
words, to identify the underlying structural relationship between tax rates and productivity, the 
analysis should be conducted in levels. 
 A further implication of (10) is that one must consider the impacts of all the taxes  𝜏𝑠, 𝜏𝑝 
and 𝜏𝑘  at the same time when assessing their impact on capital accumulation or labor 
productivity.  The impact of a shock to any one tax depends on the levels of the other taxes.  
Importantly, the tax rates  𝜏𝑠, 𝜏𝑝 and 𝜏𝑘  that affect equilibrium labor productivity are marginal 
and not average tax rates.  As is clear from equation (9), average tax receipts will reflect 
endogenous decisions on lt, kt, and yt, even if the marginal tax rates 𝜏𝑤 , 𝜏𝑠, 𝜏𝑝 , and 𝜏𝑘  are set 
outside the model.  Consequently, empirical studies of taxes on labor productivity must focus on 
marginal tax rates and not average tax rates.12   
However, because the interest rate does not depend on 𝜏𝑤 , wages and marginal products 
of labor are unaffected by wage taxes. As wage taxes rise, households cut back on labor supply, 
                                                                 
12 Mankiw, Weinzierl and Yagan’s (2009) summary of the main theoretical conclusions from the optimal tax 
literature included that the optimal tax structure is most likely flat across income levels; marginal tax rates should 
not rise and may even decline at upper income levels; and capital income should b e untaxed at the margin.  Those 
predictions reinforce that tests of the effects of tax policies on economic outcomes must consider marginal and not 
average tax rates and must distinguish between taxes on capital income versus other tax types.. 
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leaving the marginal product of labor and hence wages unchanged.13 Prescott (2002) uses a 
similar formulation to demonstrate why higher taxes on wages in Europe can result in lower 
employment and greater unemployment in European labor markets relative to the United States.  
Because this prediction is subject to our use of CES forms for utility and production and constant 
returns to scale, we test this prediction in the data and find support for the neutrality of taxes on 
wages. 
 Equation (10) also implies that equilibrium wage and labor productivity do not depend on 
the level of government expenditure.  This outcome is a consequence of our assumption that Gt  
is a pure lump-sum transfer.   Aschauer (1989), Munnell (1990), Lynde and Richmond (1993) 
and Pereira (2000) found evidence that public infrastructure encouraged private sector 
investment and productivity growth.  Subsequent work, as summarized by Aschauer (2000), 
found a wide variety of effects of government spending, including that it could be neutral or even 
lower labor productivity.  In our formulation, government expenditures can affect equilibrium 
labor productivity if Gt is an element of the Hicksian technology parameter, A.  Therefore, we 
can test formally whether Gt affects the equilibrium level of labor productivity independent of 
the effects of marginal tax rates.  However, we note that government expenditures are set by the 
level of marginal tax rates and so even with a more complex theory, they would not be present in 
the reduced form.    
V. Empirical Strategy 
 The theoretical model shows that the equilibrium level of the pretax wage, and hence the 
equilibrium average product of labor, responds negatively to the marginal property tax rate (𝜏𝑝); 
                                                                 
13 We get the same result when we use a CES utility function rather than the Cobb Douglas specification.  The wage 
tax will affect labor productivity when we relax the assumption of constant returns to scale.  Income taxes may also 
affect labor productivity if there are frictions that prevent a seamless movement toward equilibrium, as reviewed by 
Shimer (2010). 
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the sales tax rates (𝜏𝑠 ); and the marginal tax on returns to capital.  In application, the capital 
earnings tax takes on several forms including a tax on capital gains (𝜏𝑘); and a tax on corporate 
earnings (𝜏𝑐).  The equilibrium condition (10) suggests that a pure wage tax (𝜏𝑤 ) would have a 
neutral effect on labor productivity.  Rather than exclude wages taxes, we include two taxes that 
are tied to wages, state income taxes (𝜏𝑦) and unemployment insurance (𝜏𝑢 ) tax rates, and test 
whether the wage tax neutrality prediction holds.14   
 Rather than estimate the highly nonlinear relationship (10) directly, we specify the 
simpler first-order approximation as a log-linear variation relating labor productivity to the tax 
rates 
(11)   ln (
𝑦𝑖𝑡 +∆
𝑙𝑖𝑡+∆
) =  𝛽𝑜 + 𝛽𝑠 𝜏𝑠,𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑝  𝜏𝑝,𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑘  𝜏𝑘,𝑖𝑡  +𝛽𝑐  𝜏𝑐,𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑦  𝜏𝑦,𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑢 𝜏𝑢,𝑖𝑡 
    +𝑍
𝑖𝑡
′
𝛾 +𝜇𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 . 
The vector Zit will include a vector of controls to capture possible variation in productivity or 
tastes across states and across time.   
The testable predictions from the theory are that  𝛽𝑠 < 0;  𝛽𝑝 < 0;  𝛽𝑘 < 0; 𝛽𝑐 < 0.  In 
addition, if income and unemployment insurance taxes behave as wage taxes, we should find that 
𝛽𝑦 = 𝛽𝑢 = 0.  The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of output per job.  The 
theoretically appropriate dependent variable would be the marginal product rather than the 
average product of labor.  We cannot derive estimates of marginal products by state, but average 
                                                                 
14 Both taxes differ from a pure wage tax.  The income tax includes nonlabor income and the unemployment 
insurance tax is experience rated and subject to upper limits on tax amounts that make the effective marginal rate 
zero for some firms.  Nevertheless, the marginal tax rate will apply to wage income for a large number of firms and 
workers.  
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and marginal products must be positively correlated in the range of labor inputs consistent with 
profit maximization.15 
 Specification (11) subscripts output per job at t+Δ, Δ ≥ 0.  If states alter their tax policies 
in response to observed labor productivity, then contemporaneous marginal tax rates will be 
endogenous.  Because it is not plausible that there are enough instruments to identify the full 
menu of potentially endogenous tax policies, we opted instead to examine the consistency of the 
relationships estimated in (11) as we add more distance sequentially between the tax rates and 
the observed outcomes.16  If states set tax policies strategically to affect labor productivity, we 
should find evidence of instability in the coefficients.  With positive values of Δ, we create the 
possibility of overlapping time periods, leading to autocorrelated errors.  To side-step this 
problem, we sampled the data every Δ years when we used the dependent variable ln (
𝑦𝑖𝑡+∆
𝑙𝑖𝑡+∆
), 
eliminating any overlapping time periods.  As Δ increases, we drop successively more time 
periods so that if the sample size at Δ=1 is N, the sample size drops to at most N/2 at Δ=2; N/3 at 
Δ=3; and so on.  We found little sensitivity of our parameter estimates to the magnitude of Δ 
although by Δ=5, we were down to 20% of the sample which adversely affected precision of the 
estimates. 
 Another problem is possible unobserved heterogeneity that is correlated with state tax 
rates, a second possible source of endogeneity.  In particular, persistence in state labor 
                                                                 
15 The use of average products as a proxy for marginal products dates back to Cobb and Douglas (1928) who 
showed the approximation is exact in the specification that bears their names. 
16Our use of lagged fiscal policies to explain regional growth is a common identification strategy.  Previous studies 
using this specification include Benson and Johnson (1986), Mofidi and Stone (1990), Bleany et al (2001), Bania, 
Gray and Stone (2007), Reed (2008), and Gale et al (2015).  Our use of a large menu of fiscal policies is common in 
the literature evaluating how unemployment rates and durations respond to various labor market policies (Nickell 
and Layard, 1999; Blau and Kahn, 2002; Heckman and Pages, 2004; and Nickel et al,2005).  Gale et al  (2015) used 
a menu of taxes, but used tax revenues rather than tax rates for many of the taxes .  Studies using instrumental 
variables to evaluate the impact of government policies on per capita incomes such as Acemoglu et al (2001, 2005) 
can only include one or two policy variables before they overtax the identification requirements.  
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productivity over time may be attributable to unobserved state-specific effects, ηi.  In addition, 
states will face common unobserved technology and macroeconomic shocks, μt.  We use year 
dummies to control for the μt and we handle ηi as either a random effect or a state-specific fixed 
effect.17  We also propose a range of control variables to proxy for the productivity and taste 
shifters, Zit.  The remaining unobservable 𝜖𝑖𝑡 is a transitory state-specific productivity shock 
which we assume is uncorrelated with contemporaneous or past state marginal tax rates.  
While we find our results convincing, we acknowledge that if states set tax policies in 
response to these transitory state-specific productivity shocks, our coefficients will be biased. We 
subject our conclusions to several robustness checks.  Among them, we examine whether there is 
evidence that states do fine-tune their tax policies in response to productivity shocks.  We also 
examine whether similar results hold when we use alternate measures of labor productivity 
including state per capita income and average wage per job.  Finally, we examine whether there 
is a systematic relationship between marginal tax rates and productivity on either side of state 
borders.  All the tests lend support to our conclusions that marginal tax rates matter for labor 
productivity.    
VI. Data 
 The sample is dictated by the availability of data on labor productivity and state tax rates.      
We use the data for the 48 contiguous states available annually from 1981 through 2015. Our 
focus on the 48 contiguous states is consistent with the freer flows of capital, labor and goods 
that drive our equilibrium relationship between taxes and labor productivity. We review our data 
and sources and provide additional details in Appendix 1. 
 Our measure of labor productivity is Gross State Product, as reported by the Bureau of 
                                                                 
17 Bleany et al (2001) and Bania, Gray and Stone (2007) also used state and time dummies to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity across regions. 
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Economic Analysis (BEA), divided by the BEA estimate of the number of jobs in the state.  
Bauer and Lee (2006) showed that average output per worker and per hour have similar long run 
properties. 
Theory specifies of the use of state marginal tax rates and not average tax rates.  Marginal 
tax rates more closely measure the cost wedges that distort consumer and producer decisions, 
whereas average taxes reflect endogenously the income and tax revenue consequences of the 
behavioral responses to those marginal tax rates.  The National Bureau of Economic Research 
has generated estimates of state marginal income tax and long-term capital gains tax rates since 
1977.  The procedures underlying these estimates are described in Feenberg and Coutts (1993). 
We use the highest marginal tax rate for each, noting that the highest income tax rate will reflect 
also the marginal tax rate on earnings from the capital in small businesses and S corporations.  
 Corporate and sales tax rates are reported by The Council of State Governments Book of 
States.  Our marginal corporate tax rate is the highest reported state tax rate on business 
corporations. In states that report a different corporate rate for banks or financial businesses, we 
use the broader tax rate imposed on nonbank corporations.  Our sales tax measure is the highest 
reported sales tax on general merchandise and not an average that incorporates various 
exemptions for food, clothing and medicine.18   
Unlike our other taxes, the property tax is primarily a local and not a state tax.  The 
property tax rate was culled from annual information provided by the Government of the District 
of Columbia, Department of Finance and Revenue.  Since 1981, this source has reported the 
effective property tax rate on residential properties reflecting the range of housing values at 
                                                                 
18 We do not add local tax rates .  We could add average local taxes per capita but that would be inconsistent with our 
use of marginal tax rates.  We do include local expenditures on our measure of government expenditures per capita 
which would be similar to average local taxes.   
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various household incomes in the largest city in each state.19  The effective rate applies the 
percentage of assessed value that is incorporated into the tax computation,  meaning that a city 
with a 50% assessment level and a $4/100 nominal property tax rate would have the same 
effective rate as a city with a 100% assessment level and a $2/100 property tax rate. 
  The top marginal unemployment insurance tax rates for each state were provided us by 
Robert Pavosevich of the U.S. Department of Labor.  There are two components to the rate, the 
top marginal rate 𝜏𝑢,𝑖𝑡
𝑚𝑎𝑥 , and the maximum wage level to which the rate is applied, 𝑊𝑖𝑡
𝑚𝑎𝑥 .  
Because the tax is per dollar, we normalize that maximum unemployment insurance tax by the 
average compensation per job in the state, 𝑊𝑖𝑡̅̅ ̅̅̅.  These terms are combined into a single rate 
𝜏𝑢,𝑖𝑡 =
𝜏𝑢,𝑖𝑡
𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∙𝑊𝑖𝑡
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑊𝑖𝑡̅̅ ̅̅̅
. 
 Equation (11) includes a vector of productivity attributes, Zit, that may be correlated with 
state marginal tax rates.  Crain and Lee’s (1999) survey of factors included in state growth 
models identified nine families of measures which have been used to explain variation in state 
GSP growth.  Of these, we note first that demographic attributes such as ethnic composition of 
the population should change only slowly over time, and so we capture them using state and time 
dummy variables.  We measure energy costs by the price per million BTU for all end users for 
all energy types in the state as provided by the Energy Information Administration.  The level of 
human capital by year and state is measured by the percent of the population aged 18-64 that has 
at least a high school diploma as reported by the U.S. Bureau of the Census.  State industrial 
composition is measured by the share Gross State Product in manufacturing as reported by the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis.  Union political influence is measured by union density which is 
provided at the web site http://www.unionstats.com/ using the methodology reported by Hirsch 
                                                                 
19 Before that year, information was provided on a subset of states. 
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and Macpherson (2003).  Urbanization, frequently associated with agglomeration economies 
believed to foster more rapid growth, is measured by the Bureau of Census’ data on population 
density.  Finally, in some specifications we include the log of state government expenditures by 
broad area which were culled from the Tax Policy Center’s State and Local Finance Data Query 
System.  We depart from Crain and Lee in our specification of Zit in that we exclude measures of 
the capital stock and the size of the labor force as regressors, both of which are endogenously 
determined by the equilibrium responses to tax structures in equation (10). 20 
VI. Results 
 We report the estimation of various specifications of equation (11) in table 1.  We report 
results setting Δ=0, 1, 2, and 3. All the regressions included the vector of covariate controls, Zit. , 
plus a full complement of year and state dummy variables. Estimates are quite consistent across 
the specifications.21  
   The first column presents the model with contemporaneous tax policy (Δ = 0).  Two of 
the taxes, property taxes and corporate taxes, have significant negative effects on labor 
productivity, suggesting a negative effect on capital investment.  The two taxes on wages that 
should have no effect on labor productivity, the income tax and the unemployment insurance tax, 
are individually and jointly insignificant.  However, the joint test of significance across the 6 
taxes easily rejects the null hypothesis of no effect.  The implied joint effect of the 6 taxes 
evaluated at their sample means is -0.19 log points, implying that the use of distortionary 
                                                                 
20 Endogenous controls will bias the tax effects.  As an example, Gale et al (2015) added tax revenues as regressors 
and found that tax rates lost their explanatory power.  But tax revenues are functions of tax rates, as shown by Bruce 
et al (2006).  Similarly, average tax rates computed as tax revenue divided by income or property values or other 
bases are endogenous responses to the marginal tax rates.  Our inclusion of government expenditures would be 
subject to similar concerns, and so we report result with and without government expen ditures. 
21 We have a large number of time series for relatively few states which can render cluster corrections unstable 
(Wooldridge, 2003).  The problem goes away when we divide the sample in half and cluster at the state level.  Our 
solution for the full sample was to cluster at the state level separately for the data before and after 2000. 
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marginal tax rates lowers labor productivity to 83% of the level that would have prevailed had 
nondistortionary taxes been employed. 
The next 3 columns repeat the exercise with all the tax rates and covariate controls 
occurring at increasing lags.  To avoid overlapping time periods, we reduce the sample so that 
with two lags, we use every other year and with three lags we use every third year.  While the 
coefficients lose some precision, the conclusions remain the same.  Even with 3-year lags, the 
joint effect of the marginal tax rates is -0.15 or a 14% reduction in labor productivity due to the 
use of distortionary taxes.  Consistently, the wage taxes have an insignificant effect on labor 
productivity, consistent with our theoretical model under constant returns to scale technologies.22 
 In columns 5 and 6, we add in state and local government expenditures per capita.  We 
expect this specification to be the most clouded by possible simultaneity between fiscal policy 
and labor productivity because expenditures are related to tax revenues which are in turn, related 
to tax rates (Bruce et al, 2006).  Nevertheless, adding government expenditures at a 3-year lag 
did not alter our estimated marginal tax rate effects appreciably.  We find that government 
expenditures do have a positive effect on labor productivity.  Consistent with Aschauer (1989), 
Munnell (1990), Lynde and Richmond (1993) and Pereira (2000), the productivity effect is 
concentrated on government expenditures on infrastructure.  However, our findings regarding the 
effect of marginal tax rates are robust.  The smallest estimated joint effect of the 6 taxes is -0.13 
log points or a 12% reduction in labor productivity.  The joint test of the wage tax effects never 
rejects the neutrality prediction across any of the specifications.  
In table 2, we repeat the exercise using alternative measures of labor productivity.  
Column 1 repeats the estimates from column 5 in table 1 to provide a comparison.  Column 2 
                                                                 
22 When we decompose the productivity measure into output versus employment, it is clear that it is output 
responses that are driving the productivity response.  In other words, higher tax rates are lowering output in the 
numerator and not raising employment in the denominator. 
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uses per capita income as the measure of productivity.  While per capita income is largely 
composed of wage and salary income, it also includes nonlabor income and so the link with labor 
productivity is not as direct.  Consequently, the wage tax neutrality on labor productivity would 
not apply to all income types.23  Nevertheless, the findings from table 1 carry over.  The 6 taxes 
are jointly significant.  Their joint effect is to lower per capita incomes by 0.097 log points, a 
reduction of per capita incomes of 9% per year.  We cannot reject the null that the wage taxes 
have a neutral effect.  Column 3 uses average wage per job as the measure of labor productivity.  
Again, the 6 taxes are jointly significant and imply a reduction of 8% in log average wage 
compared to a purely nondistortionary tax structure.  Again, we cannot reject the null hypothesis 
that taxes on wages have neutral effects on wage levels. 
Despite our demonstration that changing lags of tax rates do not alter our findings, a 
signal of likely endogeneity of the marginal tax rates, there is the possibility that states use tax 
policy strategically to manipulate labor productivity.  This strategic option is not exercised in 
choosing which taxes to impose.  As shown in Appendix Table 2, no state added or eliminated a 
tax since 1977 except for the income tax installed in Connecticut in 1991.  In addition, states 
more frequently add or delete tax credits or exemptions to address strategic objectives rather than 
changing their highest marginal tax rates.  Nevertheless, there might be changes in marginal tax 
rates that are correlated with unobserved shocks to labor productivity.  To check this, we 
reestimated Table 1 allowing different tax effects when tax rates were raised, lowered, or left the 
same.  Strategic tax rate manipulation suggests that tax rates would be raised when any negative 
feedback is expected to be small and rates would be lowered when the positive impacts on 
capital investment are expected to be atypically large.  If true, we should find that the impact of 
                                                                 
23 For example, Reed (2008) and Giertz (2010) found that increases in marginal tax rates slowed individual income 
growth. 
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tax rates on labor productivity would differ when tax rates are rising or falling.  However, we 
could not reject the null hypothesis that the tax rate effects are the same whether they are being 
raised, lowered, or left alone.   
Taxes at state borders 
 If taxes make a difference to capital investment, the effect will be largest when capital 
flows most easily from one tax jurisdiction to another.  At state borders, firms face a common 
customer and employment bases and similar locational comparative advantages for production.  
However, locating on one side of the border versus another can result in a sharply differing menu 
of taxes.  Moreover, if there is a concern that taxes are set endogenously in response to 
anticipated labor productivity effects, a state border can be viewed as a regression discontinuity 
where the change in tax rates can be treated as locally exogenous. 
 Suppose that we observe counties in states i and j on either side of a state border.  Using 
(11), the difference between their labor productivities would be   
(12)   ln[(
𝑦𝑖𝑡+∆
𝑙𝑖𝑡+∆
) / (
𝑦𝑗𝑡 +∆
𝑙𝑗𝑡+∆
)] =  𝛽𝑠 [𝜏𝑠,𝑖𝑡 − 𝜏𝑠,𝑗𝑡 ] + 𝛽𝑝  [𝜏𝑝,𝑖𝑡 − 𝜏𝑝,𝑗𝑡] + 𝛽𝑘[ 𝜏𝑘,𝑖𝑡 −  𝜏𝑘 ,𝑗𝑡] +  
𝛽𝑐[ 𝜏𝑐,𝑖𝑡 −  𝜏𝑐,𝑖𝑡] + 𝛽𝑦[ 𝜏𝑦,𝑖𝑡 −  𝜏𝑦,𝑖𝑡] + 𝛽𝑢[ 𝜏𝑢,𝑖𝑡 − 𝜏𝑢,𝑖𝑡] + [𝑍𝑖𝑡
′
− 𝑍
𝑖𝑡
′
] 𝛾 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡 
so that differences in labor productivity between the two states will be reflected in the response 
of labor productivity to differences in their tax rates and other covariate controls on either side of 
the border plus the differences between the states in unobserved productivity 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡 .   
We do not have a good measure of labor productivity on either side of the border.  
Average wages are reported by place of work.  Because individuals can work on either side of 
the border regardless of whether they live in the more or less heavily taxed state, wages will not 
necessarily reflect taxes tied to state of residence.  Therefore, the only measure we could use was 
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the per capita income which is reported by place of residence.  The behavior also changes when 
considering tax responses at state borders versus the interior counties.  For example, some of the 
response at the border will be shifting economic investments from one state to the other rather 
than forgoing the investment altogether, and so one might suspect a larger response than in table 
2.  Consequently, the link between the theory and the data is more tenuous.  
Nevertheless, the results support the view that tax structure matters, although not in the 
same way as with the comparisons across states.  As shown in table 3, the corporate tax 
continues to hamper economic growth in the cross-border comparisons.  As before, the taxes are 
jointly significant.  But now the income tax and unemployment insurance tax also matter and the 
joint test of significance only weakly supports the neutrality assumption.  That is not necessarily 
a violation of the theory because per capita income is not just labor productivity but also returns 
to capital investments and nonlabor income returns which would be affected by taxes on wages.  
The most important corroborating evidence from table 3 is the joint effect of the 6 taxes on per 
capita income differences across the state borders.  The accumulated effect is a decrease in 
relative per capita income compared to the neighbor of about 45% when evaluated at the mean 
tax rates, about 5 time larger than the effect estimated in Table 2.  This overstates the true 
relative tax effects because the estimate represents the impact of the average tax structure 
compared to a bordering state that has no taxes, but it does show that relative marginal tax rates 
at state borders do have measurable effects on economic outcomes. 
Which taxes are the most damaging to investment and productivity? 
While our emphasis has been on examining our tax rates as a group, our estimates do 
suggest that taxes differ in their adverse effects on labor productivity.  In table 4, we report the 
average effect of each tax type on labor productivity in log points.  These are interpretable as 
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productivity elasticities relative to changes in each marginal tax rate.  The largest adverse effects 
are from corporate taxes, sales taxes and property taxes.  A combined 10 % increase in these 
three taxes would lower labor productivity by 1.44%.  Because the wage taxes are effectively 
neutral, the balance of the joint tax elasticity is attributable to the capital gains tax.  Labor 
productivity falls by 0.09% for every 10% increase in the marginal capital gains tax rate.     
 It is important to remind that even though wage taxes do not alter labor productivity, they 
are not neutral to other economic outcomes.  Because they lower labor supply sufficiently to 
leave the marginal product of labor unchanged, wage taxes are lowering household income 
through the lower induced labor supply.  Consequently, our findings should not be interpreted as 
suggesting that income taxes and unemployment insurance taxes have no distortionary effects. 
Which states have the best or worst tax structures and how persistent are their effects? 
 With the estimates from Table 1, we can rank the mix of state tax policies by how much 
they reduce labor productivity in the state.  For this exercise, we use the estimates from column 4 
of Table 1, but our results are not changed substantially using the other estimates.  What matters 
is that the strategy holds constant the estimated impact of each tax rate on labor productivity over 
the sample period and then illustrates how the evolving tax structure changes the investment 
climate in each state. 
Table 5 presents the results using each state’s marginal tax structure in 1981 and 2015.  
The first finding is that states do not change their tax structures.  The correlation between the 
estimated joint marginal tax rate effects over the 35-year span between 1981 and 2015 is 0.78.  
The rank correlation is 0.76.  Consequently, the persistence in labor productivity differences 
across states reported in section 2 is consistent with the persistence in tax policies over time.   
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The second finding is that the joint effect of the tax rates is always negative, but tax 
structures differ in their distortionary effects.  In particular, even if two states have the same 
average government expenditures per capita, the state that generates its government revenue 
using higher marginal rates will face a greater penalty in lost labor productivity.  In 1981, the 
range of estimated lost productivity varies from a low of from a low of -0.035 log points in 
Wyoming to a high of -.244 log points in Massachusetts.  Thirty- five years later, Wyoming still 
had the least distortionary tax structure at -0.028 log points while California had the most costly 
tax structure at -0.248 log points.24  These estimates are interpretable as elasticities, and so the 
difference across states in lost labor productivity dues to high marginal tax rates varies between 
3% to 22%.  These differences are not small, and because states vary their tax structures very 
infrequently if at all, the differences in tax structures cause a persistent difference in labor 
productivity across states.  Nevertheless, differences in tax structure are not large enough to 
explain even the majority of the persistent productivity gaps across states. 
Third, over the 35-year period, state tax structures have become somewhat more 
distortionary on average with the negative effect on labor productivity.  The joint tax effect of 
state marginal tax rates has risen in magnitude from -0.14 to -0.15.  However, the relative 
distortion per dollar of tax revenue raised per capita has fallen from – 21% to -10%.25  The 
reason is that labor productivity and resulting tax revenue has increased more than have marginal 
tax rates.  In other words, labor productivity has grown more due to technological changes and 
improved worker skills than it has decreased due to rising marginal tax rates. 
VII.  Conclusions 
                                                                 
24 Wyoming and other natural resource rich states are able to limit the level of their taxes by fees imposed on 
resource extractors. 
25 This is estimated as 
exp (∑ 𝛽𝑖𝜏?̅? )
6
𝑖 =1
exp (ln(𝐺))
 or the per job productivity cost relative to government expenditures per capita. 
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 We show that state tax rates consistently lower labor productivity when the analysis uses 
We use marginal rather than average tax rates; when a full menu of tax types is used; and when 
the analysis is conducted in levels rather than differences. The rationale for these choices was 
derived from a representative agent model of consumers and firms.  The equilibrium labor 
productivity reflects the underlying distortions that marginal tax rates on property, sales, and 
corporate income create for capital investment.  We find that state distortionary taxes lower 
output per job by an average of 15% per year and lower per capita income and wage per job by 
just under 10% per year.  The estimated results are consistent with the theory that increasing 
marginal tax rates on property, capital income and sales will lower equilibrium output per worker 
through their disincentive to invest in capital.  We also fail to reject the null hypothesis that taxes 
on wages do not affect labor productivity, consistent with the theory. The differences in state 
productivity associated with marginal tax rates are of similar magnitudes to the shortfall in 
output per worker found by Hsieh and Moretti (2015) attributed to housing regulations. 
 Our results of significant and robust negative effects of tax rates on economic outcomes 
are also consistent with empirical studies that incorporated subsets of the empirical strategies we 
employ.  Funderburg et al (2010) found that when they used marginal rather than average 
business tax rates, they find a negative effect on manufacturing value-added production.  Reed 
(2008) found that a lagged measure of tax burden that incorporated all state taxes lowered 
growth in state income.  Romer and Romer (2010) showed that exogenous increases in marginal 
federal tax rates had a large negative effect on investment.  Giroud and Rauh (2015) found 
significant adverse responses of firm capital investment and location choice to measures of the 
corporate tax rate as they applied to each firm.  Adhikari and Alm (2016) found that in 7 of 8 
European countries, flattening the tax rate structure increased per capita income growth.  
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Figure 1: Change in Log Output by State Attributable to Changes in Log Jobs and Log Output 
per Job, 1981 - 2015 
 
 
 
Notes: Average values are in bold.  Productivity growth is responsible for 
0.50
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Table 1: Estimated effect of tax structure on the log GSP per worker by state, 1981 – 2015 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Lag: Δ= 0 1 2 3 3 3 
Tax         
Income: 𝝉𝒚 
  
  
-0.272 -0.138 -0.228 -0.291 -0.431 -0.353 
(0.95) (0.46) (0.76) 0.88) (1.26) (1.06) 
 
Property: 𝝉𝒑 
  
  
-2.414** -2.237** -1.836** -1.792** -1.726** -1.443** 
(3.33) (2.91) (2.16) (2.68) (2.63) (2.21) 
 
Sales: 𝝉𝒔 
  
  
-1.399 -1.306 -1.374 -1.058 -0.932 -0.934 
(1.63) (1.46) (1.48) (1.23) (1.12) (1.14) 
 
Corporate:𝝉𝒄 
  
  
-0.979** -0.930* -0.758 -0.958* -0.981* -0.873* 
(2.13) (1.74) (1.38) (1.68) (1.77) (1.80) 
 
Capital Gains: 𝝉𝒌 
  
  
-0.184 -0.184 -0.212 -0.188 -0.145 -0.134 
(0.26) (0.88) (1.02) (0.88) (0.68) (0.65) 
 
Unemployment Insurance: 𝝉𝒖  
  
  
0.206 0.310 0.643 0.718 0.747 0.813 
(0.49) (0.69) (1.62) (0.78) (0.82) (0.91) 
 
Log government expenditures per 
capita 
    
0.128**            
(2.16) 
 
Log infrastructure expenditures per 
capita 
    
 
0.063**            
(2.99) 
Log transfer payments per capita 
    
 
0.001               
(0.04) 
Log other government expenditures 
per capita 
 
    
.025              
(0.53) 
Observations 1632 1632 816 528 528 528 
R-squared 0.93 0.92 0.92 0.93 0.93 0.93 
Joint tax neutrality: 
 𝛽𝑠 = 𝛽𝑝 = 𝛽𝑘 = 𝛽𝑐 = 𝛽𝑦 = 𝛽𝑢 = 0 
 F.05(6, 90)=2.21                    
2.77** 2.20* 1.55 2.07* 1.98* 1.71 
Joint tax effect:  𝛽𝑠 𝜏?̅? + 𝛽𝑝  𝜏𝑝̅̅ ̅ +
𝛽𝑘  𝜏?̅? + 𝛽𝑐  𝜏?̅? + 𝛽𝑦  𝜏𝑦̅̅ ̅ + 𝛽𝑢  𝜏𝑢̅̅ ̅ +
𝛽𝑤𝑐  𝜏𝑤𝑐̅̅ ̅̅ ̅=0 
-0.19** 
 (3.50) 
-0.17** 
 (3.03) 
-0.15** 
 (2.58) 
-0.15** 
 (2.77) 
-0.15** 
 (2.76) 
-0.13** 
 (2.54) 
Wage tax neutrality: 
 𝛽𝑦 = 𝛽𝑢 = 0,   F.05(2, 94)=3.11 
 
 
 F.05(6, 90)=2.21                    
0.09 0.32 1.40 0.58 0.96 0.81 
Notes:  t-statistics are reported in parentheses and elasticities in brackets.  Standard errors corrected for clustering on states 
before and after 2000.  Regressions include covariate controls for energy cost, fraction of the population with a high school 
degree, manufacturing as a share of GSP, state union density, and population density  along with dummy variables for  
each state and year. 
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Table 2: Estimated effect of tax structure on the log GSP per worker, log Per Capita Income, 
and log wage per job, by state, 1981 – 2015 
  ln(Productivity) ln(Per Capita Income) ln(Wage) 
Lag: Δ= 3 3 3 
Tax      
Income: 𝝉𝒚 
  
  
-0.431 0.027 0.165 
(1.26) (0.14) (0.77) 
 
Property: 𝝉𝒑 
  
  
-1.726** -0.192 -0.575 
(2.63) (0.47) (1.22) 
 
Sales: 𝝉𝒔 
  
  
-0.932 -0.991** -0.649 
(1.12) (2.25) (1.30) 
 
Corporate:𝝉𝒄 
  
  
-0.981* -0.531 -0.630 
(1.77) (1.00) (1.38) 
 
Capital Gains: 𝝉𝒌 
  
  
-0.145 -0.662** -0.520** 
(0.68) (5.19) (3.11) 
 
Unemployment Insurance: 𝝉𝒖  
  
  
0.747 0.794 0.673 
(0.82) (1.20) (1.00) 
 
Log government expenditures per 
capita 
0.128** 
(2.16) 
0.021 
(0.51) 
0.087* 
(1.82) 
Observations 528 528 528 
R-squared 0.93 0.97 0.96 
Joint tax neutrality: 
𝛽𝑠 = 𝛽𝑝 = 𝛽𝑘 = 𝛽𝑐 = 𝛽𝑦 = 𝛽𝑢 = 0 
F.05(6, 90)=2.21 
1.98* 5.90** 2.53** 
Joint tax effect:  𝛽𝑠 𝜏?̅? + 𝛽𝑝  𝜏𝑝̅̅ ̅ +
𝛽𝑘  𝜏?̅? + 𝛽𝑐  𝜏?̅? + 𝛽𝑦  𝜏𝑦̅̅ ̅ + 𝛽𝑢  𝜏𝑢̅̅ ̅ = 0 
-0.15** 
 (2.76) 
-0.097** 
 (2.76) 
-0.083**- 
 (2.57) 
Wage tax neutrality: 
 𝛽𝑦 = 𝛽𝑢 = 0,   F.05(2, 94)=3.11 
 
0.96 1.01 1.10 
Notes:  t-statistics are reported in parentheses and elasticities in brackets.  Standard errors corrected for clustering on states 
before and after 2000.  Regressions include covariate controls for energy cost, fraction of the population with a high school 
degree, manufacturing as a share of GSP, state union density, and population density  along with dummy variables for  
each state and year. 
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Table 3: Estimated effect of relative tax structure on relative log Per Capita 
Income at state borders, 1981 – 2015 
  ln(Per Capita Income) ln(Per Capita Income) 
Lag: Δ= 3 3 
Difference in tax rate between 
states  
  
Income: 𝝉𝒚 
  
  
-2.030 -2.297* 
(1.59) (1.78) 
 
Property: 𝝉𝒑 
  
  
3.914 4.793 
(1.21) (1.48) 
 
Sales: 𝝉𝒔 
  
  
-2.260 -2.335 
(1.27) (1.34) 
 
Corporate:𝝉𝒄 
  
  
-1.813* -1.80* 
(1.94) (1.90) 
 
Capital Gains: 𝝉𝒌 
  
  
2.143 2.046 
(1.36) (1.34) 
 
Unemployment Insurance: 𝝉𝒖  
  
  
-12.86** -13.02** 
(2.25) (2.27) 
 
Log government expenditures 
per capita  
0.297 
(1.36) 
Observations 10,707 10,707 
R-squared 0.065 0.068 
Joint tax neutrality: 
𝛽𝑠 = 𝛽𝑝 = 𝛽𝑘 = 𝛽𝑐 = 𝛽𝑦 = 𝛽𝑢
= 0 
F.05(6, 97)=2.22 
3.82** 4.16** 
Joint tax effect:  𝛽𝑠 𝜏?̅? +
𝛽𝑝  𝜏𝑝̅̅ ̅ + 𝛽𝑘  𝜏?̅? + 𝛽𝑐  𝜏?̅? +
𝛽𝑦  𝜏𝑦̅̅ ̅ + 𝛽𝑢  𝜏𝑢̅̅ ̅ = 0 
-0.45** 
 (2.19) 
-0.46** 
 (2.30) 
Wage tax neutrality: 
 𝛽𝑦 = 𝛽𝑢 = 0,   
F.05(2, 101)=3.12 
 
2.26 2.57* 
Notes:  t-statistics are reported in parentheses and elasticities in brackets.  Standard errors corrected for clustering on 103 
state borders.  Regressions include covariate controls for energy cost, fraction of the population with a high school degree, 
manufacturing as a share of GSP, state union density, and population density  along with dummy variables for  
each state and year. 
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Table 4:  Average estimated effect of state marginal tax rates on state labor 
productivity in log points and percent of average productivity, 1981 – 2015 
Tax Type: Mean Tax Effect 
Personal Income  5.24 -0.015 
Property  1.72 -0.031 
Sales  4.70 -0.050 
Corporate Income 6.60 -0.063 
Capital Gains  4.69 -0.009 
Unemployment Insurance  2.23 0.016 
Sum  -0.152 
Estimates based on column 4 estimates in Table 1.  Tax effect is the average estimated tax effects at each data point.
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Table 5:  Estimated productivity effect of state tax structures for the contiguous 48 states, 1981 and 2015 
 Estimated Tax Structure Effects in 1981  Estimated Tax Structure Effects in 2015 
State Summed 
tax effect 
Rank, 
Tax 
Effect 
Tax Effect relative 
to Government 
Expenditure 
 
 
 
 
Summed 
tax effect 
Rank, Tax 
Effect 
Tax Effect relative to 
Government 
Expenditure 
Alabama -0.105 11 -24.7%  -0.126 14 -10.7% 
Arizona -0.168 35 -18.7%  -0.159 25 -11.5% 
Arkansas -0.124 21 -28.7%  -0.172 33 -10.7% 
California -0.198 40 -15.2%  -0.248 48 -7.0% 
Colorado -0.095 8 -20.5%  -0.099 7 -10.0% 
Connecticut -0.202 43 -20.1%  -0.216 45 -7.4% 
Delaware -0.174 37 -17.0%  -0.123 13 -8.1% 
Florida -0.113 13 -25.2%  -0.145 18 -11.1% 
Georgia -0.138 30 -23.0%  -0.155 23 -11.6% 
Idaho -0.120 19 -25.3%  -0.171 32 -12.6% 
Illinois -0.155 31 -18.5%  -0.160 28 -9.0% 
Indiana -0.165 33 -24.7%  -0.202 40 -10.6% 
Iowa -0.171 36 -19.7%  -0.228 46 -8.3% 
Kansas -0.097 9 -21.3%  -0.139 17 -9.7% 
Kentucky -0.117 17 -24.3%  -0.159 24 -9.8% 
Louisiana -0.127 25 -20.7%  -0.160 27 -8.6% 
Maine -0.185 39 -21.9%  -0.208 43 -9.0% 
Maryland -0.176 38 -18.5%  -0.203 41 -8.3% 
Massachusetts -0.244 48 -15.8%  -0.176 34 -7.5% 
Michigan -0.135 29 -17.6%  -0.192 38 -9.9% 
Minnesota -0.210 45 -16.1%  -0.208 44 -8.3% 
Mississippi -0.113 12 -25.0%  -0.165 30 -9.7% 
Missouri -0.114 15 -25.9%  -0.139 16 -10.7% 
Montana -0.084 6 -20.5%  -0.086 5 -10.4% 
Nebraska -0.134 28 -16.5%  -0.198 39 -8.3% 
Nevada -0.049 2 -19.2%  -0.075 4 -12.0% 
New Hampshire -0.114 14 -25.0%  -0.113 9 -10.9% 
New Jersey -0.225 47 -17.5%  -0.234 47 -7.4% 
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Ranking based on the estimated joint effect of tax rates on state labor productivity using the specification in column 3 of T able 3.  The joint test that the summed tax effects differ 
across states was F(47, 1704) = 1080 which rejected the null of a common effect at the .001 level of significance.  The average estimated state effects were significantly different 
from zero in all states. 
 
 
Table 5:  Estimated productivity effect of state tax structures for the contiguous 48 states, 1981 and 2015 (continued) 
 Estimated Tax Structure Effects in 1981  Estimated Tax Structure Effects in 2015 
State Summed 
tax effect 
Rank, 
Tax 
Effect 
Tax Effect relative 
to Government 
Expenditure 
 
 
 
 
Summed tax 
effect 
Rank, Tax 
Effect 
Tax Effect relative 
to Government 
Expenditure 
New Mexico -0.132 27 -20.1%  -0.148 19 -9.0% 
New York -0.207 44 -13.7%  -0.151 20 -6.0% 
North Carolina -0.124 20 -25.3%  -0.131 15 -10.4% 
North Dakota -0.118 18 -20.2%  -0.089 6 -8.3% 
Ohio -0.167 34 -20.7%  -0.114 10 -9.8% 
Oklahoma -0.093 7 -24.2%  -0.155 22 -11.4% 
Oregon -0.126 24 -17.3%  -0.120 11 -9.2% 
Pennsylvania -0.202 42 -19.9%  -0.187 36 -8.5% 
Rhode Island -0.214 46 -17.9%  -0.181 35 -8.2% 
South Carolina -0.128 26 -24.0%  -0.166 31 -10.2% 
South Dakota -0.055 4 -22.8%  -0.048 2 -12.1% 
Tennessee -0.125 22 -21.1%  -0.160 29 -10.6% 
Texas -0.078 5 -26.1%  -0.104 8 -11.4% 
Utah -0.103 10 -21.4%  -0.122 12 -10.7% 
Vermont -0.165 32 -20.1%  -0.207 42 -7.8% 
Virginia -0.115 16 -23.7%  -0.154 21 -10.5% 
Washington -0.055 3 -15.1%  -0.059 3 -9.2% 
West Virginia -0.125 23 -22.2%  -0.159 26 -10.3% 
Wisconsin -0.199 41 -17.8%  -0.191 37 -8.9% 
Wyoming -0.035 1 -15.3%  -0.028 1 -6.8% 
Average -0.138  -20.7%  -0.153  -9.8% 
Appendix I:  Data Definitions (not for inclusion) 
The following data was collected for each of the 48 contiguous states of the United States from 1977 
through 2015.   
1. Dependent Variables:  All compiled from the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic 
Analysis Regional Economic Accounts  https://www.bea.gov/regional/index.htm 
Log Productivity: log(Real Gross State Product/Job) 
Real Gross State Product (GSP) Real GDP by state (millions of chained 2009 dollars) is an inflation-
adjusted measure of each state's GSP that is based on national prices for the goods and services 
produced within the state, measured in millions of chained (2009) dollars.   
Jobs.  SA4 Personal Income and Employment by Major Component 
Number of full-time and part time jobs in the state. Wage and salary jobs and proprietors’ jobs are 
counted, but unpaid family workers and volunteers are not. Proprietors’ employment  consists of the 
number of sole proprietorships and the number of general partners. Wage and salary employment is on 
a place-of-work basis. Proprietors’ employment, however, is more nearly by place of residence 
because, for nonfarm sole proprietorships, the estimates are based on IRS tax data that reflect the 
addresses from which the proprietors’ individual tax returns are filed, which are usually the 
proprietors’ residences.  
Log Real per capita income: log(Personal Income/Population)  
Per capita personal income is calculated as the personal income of the residents of a given area divided 
by the resident population of that area. 
Personal income SA1 - Personal Income Summary: Personal Income, Population, Per Capita Personal 
Income  
includes income from provision of labor, land, and capital used in current production as well as other 
income, such as personal current transfer receipts. In the state and local personal income accounts the 
personal income of an area represents the income received by or on behalf of the persons residing in that 
area. It is calculated as the sum of wages and salaries, supplements to wages and salaries, proprietors' 
income with inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustments, rental income of persons with 
capital consumption adjustment, personal dividend income, personal interest income, and personal 
current transfer receipts, less contributions for government social insurance plus the adjustment for 
residence. This is converted into 1999 chained dollars. 
Population SA1 - Personal Income Summary: Personal Income, Population, Per Capita Personal 
Income   The number of civilian and military individuals who reside in a given area. 
 
 
Log Real Wage per Job Average compensation per job is compensation of employees divided by 
total full-time and part-time wage and salary employment. 
Wages and salaries  SA4 Personal Income and Employment by Major Component 
Broadly defined to include commissions, tips, and  bonuses; voluntary employee contributions to 
deferred compensation plans, such as  401(k) plans; employee gains from exercising stock options; and   
receipts-in-kind that represent income.  Supplements to wages and salaries consist of employer 
contributions for employee pension and insurance funds (previously called other labor income) and 
employer contributions for government social insurance. Supplements accounted for 18.9 percent of 
compensation at the national level.  These are converted into 1999 chained constant dollars 
Wage and salary employment SA4 Personal Income and Employment by Major Component The 
average annual number of full-time and part-time jobs in each area by place of work. The measure is 
based on the same source data as the corresponding earnings estimates and are prepared with parallel 
methodologies.  All jobs for which wages and salaries are paid are counted. Although compensation 
paid to jurors, expert legal witnesses, prisoners, and justices of the peace (for marriage fees), is counted 
in wages and salaries, these activities are not counted as jobs in wage and salary employment. 
Corporate directorships are counted as self-employment. 
County Data 
Log Real per capita income: log(Personal Income/Population)  same definitions as above except 
the county area data is used.  Data is from CA4 Personal Income and Employment by Major 
Component 
2. Independent Variables 
2A. Marginal Tax Rates: 
Income Tax Rate   Feenberg, Daniel Richard, and Elizabeth Coutts. 1993. “An Introduction to the 
TAXSIM Model.”  Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 12(1): 189-194.  
Capital Gains Tax Rate   Feenberg, Daniel Richard, and Elizabeth Coutts. 1993. “An Introduction to 
the TAXSIM Model.”  Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 12(1): 189-194.  
Property Tax Rate   The effective property tax rate per $100 of assessed value in the largest city of 
each state.  The estimate is based on housing values for households of varying incomes.  Government 
of the District of Columbia, Department of Finance and Revenue, Tax Rates and Tax Burdens in the 
District of Columbia: A Nationwide Comparison, Various years. 
Sales Tax Rate  The highest state retail sales tax rate ignoring exemptions or rebates.  This is reported 
annually in Council of State Governments. The Book of the States. Lexington, KY.  
Corporate Tax Rate  The highest state corporate tax rate ignoring exemptions or rebates.  This is 
reported annually in Council of State Governments. The Book of the States. Lexington, KY.  
Unemployment Insurance Tax Rate  The top marginal unemployment insurance tax rates for each 
state were provided us by Robert Pavosevich of the U.S. Department of Labor.  There are two 
components to the rate, the top marginal rate 𝜏𝑢,𝑖𝑡
𝑚𝑎𝑥 , and the maximum wage level to which the rate is 
applied, 𝑊𝑖𝑡
𝑚𝑎𝑥 .  We normalize that maximum wage by the average compensation per job in the state, 
𝑊𝑖𝑡̅̅ ̅̅̅, as defined above using data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis SA4 Personal Income and 
Employment by Major Component.  These terms are combined into a single rate 𝜏𝑢,𝑖𝑡 =
𝜏𝑢,𝑖𝑡
𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∙𝑊𝑖𝑡
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑊𝑖𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
.   
Additional Controls 
Log Real State and Local Government Expenditures per Capita  Information on aggregated total 
state and local government expenditures as well as expenditures on capital, transfer payments and 
other government expenditures were compiled from the Urban Institute’s State and Local Finance 
Initiative Data Query System.  The first measure was the logarithm of aggregated state and local 
government expenditures divided by population and converted to 2009 chained constant dollars.   
The second took the logarithms of the following disaggregated total government expenditures into: 
• Total Capital Outlays (E006).  This was divided by population and converted to 2009 chained 
constant dollars.  
• Transfer Payments = Health and Hospital Direct Expenditures (E052) + Housing & 
Community Direct Expenditures (E074) + Public Welfare Direct Expenditures (E090). This 
was divided by population and converted to 2009 chained constant dollars. 
• Other Government Expenditures = Total – capital outlay – transfer payments.  This was 
divided by population and converted to 2009 chained constant dollars. 
Energy Prices  The price per million BTU across all end users of all energy types as measured by 
variable TETCD in the U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Association, State Energy 
Data System (SEDS): 1960-2015   
http://www.eia.gov/state/seds/seds-data-complete.php?sid=US#PricesExpenditures 
 
High School Share  Proportion of the population aged 25 and over with at least a high school degree.  
The U.S. Bureau of the Census Educational Attainment of the Population 25 Years and Over, By State 
was a compilation provided by the Census historically. For more recent years, state educational 
attainment data was compiled from information provided by the Census through its American 
Community Survey. 
Population Density  Population per square mile.  Population was reported by the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis series, SA1 - Personal Income Summary: Personal Income, Population, Per Capita Personal 
Income.  This was divided by the square miles in the state. 
Union Density  This database provides time-consistent national and state-level estimates of union 
density for the years 1964 through 2017.  Two sources of data are combined to produce these 
estimates, the Current Population Survey (cps), a monthly survey of U.S. households, and the 
discontinued BLS publication Directory of National Unions and Employee Associations, based on data 
reported by labor unions to the government.  The union density measure represents the percentage of 
nonagricultural wage and salary employees who are union members, including employees in the public 
sector. 
© 2018 by Barry T. Hirsch, David A. Macpherson, and Wayne G. Vroman 
www.unionstats.com   
 
Hirsch, Barry T. and David A. Macpherson. 2003. "Union Membership and Coverage Database from 
the Current Population Survey: Note," Industrial and Labor Relations Review 56(2): 349-354. 
Barry T. Hirsch, David A. Macpherson, and Wayne G. Vroman.  State Union Membership Density, 
1964-2017 www.unionstats.com 
Barry T. Hirsch, David A. Macpherson, and Wayne G. Vroman, “Estimates of Union Density by 
State,” Monthly Labor Review, Vol. 124, No. 7, July 2001, pp. 51-55. 
Manufacturing Share Real GDP by state (millions of chained 2009 dollars) is an inflation-adjusted 
measure of each state's GSP that is based on national prices for the goods and services produced within 
the state, measured in millions of chained (2009) dollars.  GSP in manufacturing is divided by total 
GSP.   
 
Appendix Table IA: Descriptive statistics for key variables from 1981-2015 (not for inclusion) 
Variable Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Minimum Maximum 
  
   
  
Income Tax 5.24 3.1 0% 14.1 
Property Tax 1.71 0.83 0.30 7.87 
Sales & Excise Tax 4.7 1.8 0 8.25 
Corporate Tax 6.6 2.9 0 13.8 
Capital Gains Tax 4.69 3.0 0 14.1 
Unemployment Insurance Tax 2.22 1.1 0.04 17.6 
Percent with High School Diploma 80.4 7.8 48.1 93.1 
Ln Real Energy Prices 2.41 0.42 1.61 3.38 
Percent Union Membership 13.1 6. 29 2.0 38.3 
Ln Population Density 4.45 1.30 1.54 7.11 
Proportion of GSP in Manufacturing 0.16 0.07 0.03 0.35 
 
  
Appendix II.  Derivation of the reduced form for labor productivity (not for inclusion) 
There are four alternative taxes: 
𝜏𝑘 :  The tax rate on capital income; 
𝜏𝑤 : The tax rate on wage income; 
𝜏𝑝 : The property tax rate;  
τs: The sales tax rate. 
 
The representative household 
The household’s preferences are given by  
 
∑ 𝐵 𝑡[𝛼𝑙𝑛𝑐𝑡
∞
𝑡 =0 + (1 − 𝛼)𝑙𝑛 (1 − 𝑙𝑡)]  
 
where ct denotes real consumption of a single homogeneous good and lt denotes household’s labor supply. The parameters 
B and α are, respectively, household tastes for time preference and relative taste for consumption versus leisure.  Total time 
is normalized to one, and so (1- lt) is the time devoted to leisure.  The household gets income from three sources, labor it 
rents to firms at the market wage rate 𝑤𝑡 ; real holdings of capital, 𝑘𝑡  that it rents to firms at the pretax market rental rate, 𝑟𝑡 ; 
and a lump-sum transfer it receives from the government, G.  With 𝜏𝑘  as the tax rate on capital income; 𝜏𝑤  as the tax on 
wage income; and 𝜏𝑝  as the property tax rate (the tax on capital holdings); the household’s budget constraint is  
 
𝑐𝑡 + 𝑘𝑡+1 ≤ (1 − 𝜏𝑤 )𝑤𝑡 𝑙𝑡 + (1 − 𝜏𝑘 )𝑟𝑡𝑘𝑡 + (1 − 𝛿 − 𝜏𝑝 )𝑘𝑡 + 𝐺𝑡   
 
where 𝛿  represents the capital depreciation rate.   
 
The household chooses c
t
, l
t
, and k
t+1
, for each t, to maximize its present discounted utility. The Lagrangian of the problem 
can be written as  
 
𝛹 = ∑ 𝐵 𝑡[𝛼𝑙𝑛𝑐𝑡
∞
𝑡 =0 + (1 − 𝛼)ln (1 − 𝑙𝑡)] + ∑ 𝐵
𝑡𝜆𝑡[
∞
𝑡 =0
(1 − 𝜏𝑤 )𝑤𝑡𝑙𝑡 + (1 − 𝜏𝑘 )𝑟𝑡 𝑘𝑡 +  
  (1 − 𝛿 − 𝜏𝑝 )𝑘𝑡 + 𝐺𝑡 − 𝑐𝑡 − 𝑘𝑡 +1]; 
 
with first order conditions:  
 
𝛼
𝑐𝑡
= 𝜆 𝑡  
1−𝛼
1− 𝑙𝑡
= 𝜆 𝑡(1 − 𝜏𝑤)𝑤𝑡   
𝑟𝑡 =
𝐵−1−1+𝛿+𝜏𝑝
1−𝜏𝑘
  
 
The first condition equates marginal utility of consumption to the marginal utility of income.  When we combine the firs t 
two conditions, we get the standard condition (5a) in the text relating the marginal rate of substitution between consumption  
and leisure to their relative prices:  
 
 
(1−𝛼)𝑐𝑡
𝛼 (1−𝑙𝑡)
= (1 − 𝜏𝑊 )𝑤𝑡  
 
The last first-order condition (5B in the text) is the Euler equation that fixes growth of capital in steady state.  Note that if 
the tax rates don’t change, and with fixed depreciation and discount rates, the pretax return on capital is fixed over time.   
The representative firm 
The representative firm hires labor and capital stock in order to produce output according to the CES production function,   
 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝐴 [𝜃𝑘𝑡
1−
1
𝜀 + (1 − 𝜃)𝑙
𝑡
1−
1
𝜀 ]
𝜀
𝜀−1
  
where 𝜀 is the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor. The firm’s profit maximization problem is to select 𝑘𝑡  
and 𝑙𝑡 to maximize profit 
 
Πt = {(1 − τs )𝐴 [𝜃𝑘𝑡
1−
1
𝜀 + (1 − 𝜃)𝑙
𝑡
1−
1
𝜀 ]
𝜀
𝜀−1
− 𝑤𝑡𝑙𝑡 − 𝑟𝑡 𝑘𝑡}   
 
which yields the first order conditions  
𝑟𝑡 = (1 − 𝜏𝑠)𝐴 [𝜃𝑘𝑡
1−
1
𝜀 + (1 − 𝜃)𝑙
𝑡
1−
1
𝜀 ]
1
𝜀−1
𝜃𝑘
𝑡
−
1
𝜀  
𝑤𝑡 = (1 − 𝜏𝑠 )𝐴 [𝜃𝑘𝑡
1−
1
𝜀 + (1 − 𝜃) 𝑙
𝑡
1−
1
𝜀]
1
𝜀−1
(1 − 𝜃)𝑙
𝑡
−
1
𝜀  
Combining the first order conditions  yields the optimal capital labor ratio (8) in the text: 
 
𝑘𝑡
𝑙𝑡
= (
𝜃
(1−𝜃)
𝑤𝑡
𝑟𝑡
)
𝜀
  
 
The government  
The government collects all four taxes and rebates all revenues back to the household in the form of a lump sum rebate,  
 
𝐺𝑡 = 𝜏𝑤 𝑤𝑡𝑙𝑡 + 𝜏𝑠𝑦𝑡 + 𝜏𝑝 𝑘𝑡 + 𝜏𝑘 𝑟𝑡 𝑘𝑡   
 
Equilibrium  
Notice first from (5B) that 𝑟𝑡  is solely dependent on 𝜏𝑝  and 𝜏𝑘 . State tax policy therefore fixes the before tax return on 
capital.  The rental value of labor 𝑤𝑡  is derived by inserting (A3) into (A2).  We get  
 
𝑤𝑡 = (1 − 𝜃) (1 − 𝜏𝑠)𝐴 [𝜃 (
𝑘𝑡
𝑙𝑡
)
1−
1
𝜀
+ (1 − 𝜃) ]
1
𝜀−1
  
     = (1 − 𝜃) (1 − 𝜏𝑠 )𝐴 [𝜃 ([(
𝜃
1−𝜃
)
𝑤𝑡
𝑟𝑡
]
𝜀
)
1−
1
𝜀
+ (1 − 𝜃)]
1
𝜀−1
  
Solving for 𝑤𝑡  yields the equilibrium condition for the wage level (10) in the text, 
 
𝑤𝑡 = [
(1−𝜃)𝜀
([(1−𝜏𝑠)𝐴]
1−𝜀−
𝜃𝜀
𝑟𝑡𝜀−1
)
]
1
𝜀−1
    
  
Appendix Table 2: Presence or Absence of State Tax  by Type of Tax, 1977-2015 (not for inclusion) 
 
State Income 
Tax 
Property 
Tax 
Sales & 
Excise 
Tax 
Corporate 
Profits 
Tax 
Capital 
Gains Tax 
Workers 
Comp Tax 
Unemployment 
Insurance 
Alabama       
Arizona       
Arkansas       
California       
Colorado       
Connecticut Post 1990      
Delaware       
Florida 0    0  
Georgia       
Idaho       
Illinois       
Indiana       
Iowa       
Kansas       
Kentucky       
Louisiana       
Maine       
Maryland       
Massachusetts       
Michigan       
Minnesota       
Mississippi       
Missouri       
Montana       
Nebraska       
Nevada 0   0 0  
New Hampshire 0    0  
New Jersey       
New Mexico       
New York       
North Carolina       
North Dakota       
Ohio       
Oklahoma       
Oregon       
Pennsylvania       
Rhode Island       
South Carolina       
South Dakota 0   0 0  
Tennessee 0    0  
Texas 0   0 0  
Utah       
Vermont       
Virginia       
Washington 0   0 0  
West Virginia       
Wisconsin       
Wyoming 0   0 0  
 : Continuous presence of the tax since 1977.   0: The state never imposed the tax 
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Appendix Table 3:  State Marginal Tax Rates in 1981 and 2015 by Tax Type  (not for inclusion) 
 Income Tax Capital Gains Tax Sales Tax 
Corporate Income 
Tax 
Unemployment 
Insurance Tax Property Tax 
State 1981 2015 1981 2015 1981 2015 1981 2015 1981 2015 1981 2015 
Alabama 2.56 3.02 3.77 3.83 4 4 5 6.5 1.63 1.05 0.69 0.73 
Arizona 4.17 4.34 1.14 4.34 4 5.6 10.5 6.5 0.96 0.92 0.98 1.31 
Arkansas 7 7 5.6 3.85 3 6.5 6 6.5 2.12 1.60 1.09 1.4 
California 11 14.1 7.15 14.1 4.75 7.5 9.6 8.84 1.24 0.57 1.1 1.14 
Colorado 3.48 4.77 0.95 4.77 3 2.9 5 4.63 1.45 1.47 0.76 0.66 
Connecticut 0 6.99 2.8 6.99 7.25 6.35 10 7.5 2.19 1.29 2.25 2.95 
Delaware 13.5 6.8 5.4 6.8 0 0 8.7 8.7 2.55 2.29 3.34 1.32 
Florida 0 0 0 0 4 6 5 5.5 1.66 0.65 1.96 1.85 
Georgia 6 6.18 2.4 6.18 3 4 6 6 2.04 0.83 2.32 1.78 
Idaho 7.5 7.49 3 7.49 3 6 6.5 7.4 3.29 3.93 1.23 1.63 
Illinois 2.5 3.75 2.5 3.75 4 6.25 6.675 7.75 1.94 1.51 2.83 0.68 
Indiana 1.9 3.3 0.76 3.3 4 7 6 7 1.21 1.30 3.74 3.03 
Iowa 6.95 5.64 1.92 7.1 3 6 10 12 3.17 3.82 2.34 2.65 
Kansas 4.71 4.67 1.29 4.67 3 6.15 4.5 4 1.42 1.58 0.93 1.38 
Kentucky 3.09 6.18 0.84 6.18 5 6 5.9 6 3.53 1.83 1.23 1.18 
Louisiana 2.91 3.6 0.79 4.74 3 4 8 8 1.10 0.83 0.94 1.52 
Maine 10 7.95 4 7.95 5 5.5 6.93 8.93 1.98 1.54 2.44 2.06 
Maryland 5 5.83 2 5.83 5 6 7 8.25 1.82 1.05 2.82 2.25 
Massachusetts 5.38 5.15 6.45 5.15 5 6.25 9.4962 8 2.24 2.10 4.96 1.31 
Michigan 4.6 4.25 1.84 4.25 4 6 2.35 6 2.44 1.61 3.94 3.46 
Minnesota 8.7 10.15 3.47 10.15 4.5 6.88 12 9.8 3.53 4.28 2.28 1.31 
Mississippi 3.85 5.07 3.85 5.07 5 7 4 5 1.69 1.63 0.86 1.72 
Missouri 2.91 6.08 0.79 6.08 3.125 4.23 5 6.25 1.95 2.19 2.08 1.16 
Montana 5.82 7.11 1.6 5.11 0 0 6.75 6.75 2.12 3.59 0.84 0.92 
Nebraska 9.39 7.02 3.76 7.02 3 5.5 4.4 7.81 1.22 0.89 1.95 2.1 
Nevada 0 0 0 0 4.375 6.85 0 0 1.76 2.53 0.83 1.15 
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Appendix Table 3:  State Marginal Tax Rates in 1981 and 2015 by Tax Type (continued)  
 Income Tax Capital Gains Tax Sales Tax 
Corporate Income 
Tax 
Unemployment 
Insurance Tax Property Tax 
State 1981 2015 1981 2015 1981 2015 1981 2015 1981 2015 1981 2015 
New Hampshire 0 0 0 0 0 0 8.54 8.5 2.46 1.31 2.78 2.31 
New Jersey 2.5 8.97 2.5 8.97 5 7 8.25 9 2.61 2.95 5.56 2.9 
New Mexico 6.28 5.05 2.51 2.6 3.625 5.13 5.5 6.9 2.08 2.73 1.83 1.57 
New York 12.5 6.89 8.07 6.89 4 4 10 7.1 1.53 1.12 1.6 0.86 
North Carolina 7 5.75 7 5.75 3 4.75 6 5 2.27 2.13 1 1.16 
North Dakota 2.44 2.9 0.98 1.78 3 5 7.75 4.53 2.86 5.70 1.33 1.24 
Ohio 3.33 5 1.33 5 4.5 5.75 8.35 0 1.46 1.29 2.12 2.15 
Oklahoma 6 5.14 2.4 0.15 2 4.5 4 6 1.07 1.67 1.08 2.62 
Oregon 10 9.99 4 9.99 0 0 7.5 7.6 2.26 3.18 1.86 1.26 
Pennsylvania 2.2 3.07 2.2 3.07 6 6 10.5 9.99 2.31 1.52 2.43 1.34 
Rhode Island 8.78 5.99 4.57 5.99 6 7 8 7 3.21 3.25 3.52 1.93 
South Carolina 7 7.08 3.5 4.02 4 6 6 5 1.63 1.57 0.71 2.11 
South Dakota 0 0 0 0 4 4 0 0 2.85 2.86 1.86 1.48 
Tennessee 0 0 0 0 4.5 7 6 6.5 1.56 1.60 1.74 1.95 
Texas 0 0 0 0 4 6.25 0 0 1.28 1.04 2.52 2.54 
Utah 4.03 5 1.1 5 4 5.95 4 5 1.89 4.06 1.25 0.93 
Vermont 13.71 8.8 5.48 8.8 3 6 7.5 8.5 2.47 2.53 1.6 2.15 
Virginia 5.75 5.83 2.3 5.83 3 5.3 6 6 2.26 0.76 1.17 0.99 
Washington 0 0 0 0 5 6.5 0 0 1.62 3.51 0.76 0.88 
West Virginia 8.76 6.5 3.5 6.5 3.5 6 6 6.5 2.51 1.74 0.93 0.84 
Wisconsin 10 7.65 10 5.36 4 5 7.9 7.9 2.45 2.91 2.84 2.85 
Wyoming 0 0 0 0 3 4 0 0 1.08 4.09 0.63 0.84 
Average 5.07 5.13 2.70 4.80 3.67 5.20 6.23 6.18 2.04 2.09 1.91 1.66 
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Appendix Table 4: Estimated effect of tax structure on the log GSP per worker by state, 1981 – 2015 (not for inclusion) 
 1A 1B 2A 2B 3A 3B 4A 4B 5 6 
Lag: Δ= 0 0 1 1 2 2 3 3 3 3 
Tax             
Income:  -0.125 -0.272 -0,223 -0.138 -0.288 -0.228 -0.307 -0.291 -0.431 -0.353 
 (0.80) (0.95) (0.66) (0.46) (0.90) (0.76) (0.94) (0.88) (1.26) (1.06) 
Property:  -2.667** -2.414** -2.30** -2.237** -2.01** -1.836** -1.751 -1.792** -1.726** -1.443** 
 (3.53) (3.33) (3.21) (2.91 (2.62) (2.16) (2.75) (2.68) (2.63) (2.21) 
Sales:  -1.56 -1.399 -1.456 -1.306 -1.457 -1.374 -1.149 -1.058 -0.932 -0.934 
 (1.61) (1.63) (1.62) (1.46) (1.59) (1.48) (1.38) (1.23) (1.12) (1.14) 
Corporate: -1.140** -0.979** -1.111** -0.930* -0.942* -0.758 -1.036* -0.958* -0.981* -0.873* 
 (2.15) (2.13) (2.09) (1.74) (1.81) (1.38) (1.86) (1.68) (1.77) (1.8) 
Capital Gains:  -0.300 -0.184 -0.272 -0.184 -0.283 -0.212 -0.208 -0.188 -0.145 -0.134 
 (1.15) (0.26) (1.17) (0.88) (1.22) (1.02) (0.89) (0.88) (0.68) (0.65) 
Unemployment 
Insurance:  
0.080 0.206 0.267 0.31 0.664 0.643 0.892 0.718 0.747 0.813 
 (0.18) (0.49) (0.54) (0.69) (1.59) (1.62) (1.00) (0.78) (0.82) (0.91) 
Log government 
expenditures per 
capita 
        0.128** 
(2.16) 
 
Log infrastructure 
expenditures per 
capita 
         0.063**            
(2.99) 
Log transfer 
payments per capita 
         0.001               
(0.04) 
Log other 
government 
expenditures per 
capita 
         .025              
(0.53) 
ln(energy price)  0.088    0.069  .029  .062 0.045 0.036 
  (1.24)  (1.03)  (0.44)  (1.16) (0.91) (0.79) 
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Appendix Table 4: Estimated effect of tax structure on the log GSP per worker by state, 1981 – 2015 (continued) 
 1A 1B 2A 2B 3A 3B 4A 4B 5 6 
Lag: Δ= 0 0 1 1 2 2 3 3 3 3 
Proportion High 
School Plus 
 0.028  -0.032  -0.094  -0.107 -0.200 -0.173 
  (0.20)  (0.24)  (0.57)  (0.64) (1.26) (1.12) 
Proportion 
Manufacturing 
 -0.422*  -0.308  -.240  -.046 0.003 -0.023 
  (1.77)  (1.32)  (1.01)  (0.19) (0.01) (0.10) 
Proportion Union 
Density 
 0.567**  0.541**  0.431**  0.432** 0.378** 0.409 
  (3.14)  (3.12)  (2.87)  (2.34) (2.12) (2.37) 
ln(Population 
Density) 
 0.110*  0.077  0.053  0.020 .037 0.039 
  (1.75)  (1.25)  (0.41)  (0.30) (0.56) (0.58) 
Joint tax effect -0.21** -0.19** -0.20** -0.17** -0.17** -0.15** -0.16** -0.15** -0.15** -0.13** 
 (3.99) (3.50) (3.84) (3.03) (3.49) (2.58) (3.35) (2.77) (2.76) (2.54) 
Observations 1632 1632 1632 1632 816 816 528 528 528 528 
R-squared 0.91 0.93 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.93 0.93 0.93 
 
 
 
